Th e use of patristic texts was tightly bound up with the needs of the contemporary discussion which provided Grotius with sources for his patristic citations. His use of ancient texts especially in Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae pietas proved to be highly controversial.
Cyprian, Lactantius, somewhat less often on Athanasius, Justin, and the historians Eusebius, Socrates and Th eodoret, and occasionally on Chrysostom. After 1613, Grotius cites Greek authors more extensively. Unlike Bullinger, Grotius refers to the Greek editions that had been printed in the meantime. But other than this, did nothing change in the fi fty years separating Bullinger and Grotius regarding the reading of patristic texts?
In his Dutch period Grotius uses patristic sources most extensively in two writings, Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae pietas 2 of 1613 and De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra , fi nished in 1617.
3 Th e citations in these works serve to display academic erudition, and Grotius meets thereby the scholarly expectations of his time. But one man's meat is another man's poison. His direct opponent, Sibrandus Lubbertus, speaks of arrogantia 4 in describing Ordinum pietas , and Lubbertus' own writings appear rather plain in comparison to Grotius'. 5 As the reactions to Ordinum pietas quickly demonstrated, Grotius's eff orts to show intellectual mastery did lasting damage to the reception of the book and to his reputation. However, Grotius had reason to do as he did, and he continued to use all the intellectual and rhetorical means at his disposal in De imperio , though more carefully. 6 His competence, as a jurisconsult , to consider religious matters was sharply disputed, refl ecting the broader confl ict between State and Church. Showing familiarity with the tools of scholarly discourse was an attempt to demonstrate his qualifi cations in religious aff airs.
Th e ongoing debate shaped its canon of quotations. A quotation supports argumentation only insofar as there is agreement on the value and importance of its author. Th e use of patristic texts was therefore tightly bound up with the needs of the contemporary discussion. Th is is evident as long as patristic references served merely to support partisan positions within a normative 2 66, (Leiden: Brill, 1995) . Ordinum pietas will be cited from this edition, by section (and page and line number) .
Hugo Grotius, Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfriesiae pietas (1613). Critical edition with English translation and commentary, ed. by Edwin Rabbie, Studies in the History of Christian Th ought
3 van Dam, De imperio, introduction, p. 19. De Imperio was published only in 1647. 4 Sibrandus Lubbertus, Responsio Ad Pietatem Hugonis Grotii (Franeker: Rombertus Droyema, 1614), dedication letter, cf. p. 110. 5 Lubbertus' principal writings show clearly the limitation of his knowledge, being based mainly on a collection of the acts of councils and a number of quotations of Augustine, and using Stephanus' Th esaurus for broader ancient material; cf. Sibrandus Lubbertus, De conciliis libri quinque, Scholastice & Th eologice collati cum disputationibus Roberti Bellarmini (Geneva: Petrus Rouerianus, 1601). 6 On the background and context of Ordinum pietas and De Imperio, see Edwin Rabbie, 'L'Eglise et l'Etat dans la pensée de Hugo Grotius', Grotiana , 16/17 (1995/96), 97-117. discourse. However, this also holds for a debate in fl ux, a debate that became cognizant of other texts that were relevant from a new point of view and no longer followed exclusively the pattern of the already known. It has already been recognized that Grotius depended heavily on the writings of his contemporaries as a source for his patristic citations. In their editions, Rabbie and van Dam have identifi ed numerous examples of patristic quotations present in Grotius that can also be found in the contemporary literature. 7 It may be concluded that these quotations do not indicate Grotius's own reading of ancient texts but rather originated in the books of his contemporaries.
More interesting, however, is the way in which the quotations in Grotius are embedded in the contemporary debate. For example, Grotius cites Gregory of Nazianzus, ep. 130, 8 as follows: 'Gregory of Nazianzus spoke rather harshly of synods, for he said that he "avoided any assembly of bishops" since he had seen no meeting that did not cause rather "an increase than a solution of trouble, for contentiousness and lust of power are stronger than reason"'. 9 At the time of Grotius's writing, the authority of the State in matters of religion was being challenged, and the call for a synod on the predestination controversy was in the air. Grotius Grotius was not one to introduce new texts into the debate, but all the same, his use of ancient texts in Ordinum pietas proved to be highly controversial. Lubbertus called Grotius's choice of texts 'unfortunate'.
14 Johannes Bogerman, who wrote a rebuttal to Ordinum pietas in the form of annotations, addressed Grotius's use of patristic texts as well. In Bogerman's critique can be read the reproach that in his readers' best interest, Grotius should have indicated his sources more precisely, 15 a point in a debate de usu patrum that was hardly justifi ed by Grotius's actual handling of citations or by his dependence on Whitaker. Rather, the criticisms levied by Lubbertus and Bogerman show that the controversy had aff ected the reading of patristic sources.
Th e task presents itself to describe transitions in the debate in the beginning of the seventeenth century and their eff ect on the reading of patristic sources. Grotius's own observations concerning the use of patristic sources in Ordinum pietas and De imperio shall serve as a starting point. Even though in Grotius clusters of proofs can be found that draw on the normative discourse, attention will be given to passages that refl ect a certain contextualization of patristic texts within antiquity. In the second part of the essay, this line will be traced back to Grotius's earlier work, De iure praedae. ' In the same way the Christian emperors forbade assemblies of heretics and schismatics; they ordered them to give up their basilicas to the Catholic Church, they prevented heretics and schismatics from gaining access to high offi ces; they even took away the right to acquire anything by testament. All these things are defended extensively by Augustine against the Donatists. For the ancient Church did not disapprove of the kind of punishment that left time for repentance to those who the undisputed basis of the debate. Th e claim to be in agreement with the ancient Church was made over and over again on all sides, and Grotius is no exception in this respect. Nevertheless, he diff ers in his approach from, for example, his opponent Sibrandus Lubbertus. Various parties could claim the authority of the Early Church only because contradictory things were said by ancient writers. But how should one deal with this diversity? Or how should it be interpreted? In contrast to Sibrandus Lubbertus, these questions are important to Grotius. Consider a statement like the following: 'Do not Calvin and others when they loudly protest against the freedom of will often repeat, in this respect the Fathers should not be listened to?' 19 Grotius disagrees with both content and method, but his alternative is not simply to follow the Early Church in every respect. On the contrary, he recognizes the variety of expression in the Early Church. Th is is the point of departure for developing a picture of Grotius's conception of the Early Church.
I. Examples of modestia in History

Patristic
Grotius's advocacy of moderation and tolerance with respect to various forms of Christianity is a major purpose in Ordinum pietas and De imperio and determines his use of patristic texts as well. It was precisely this modestia or moderation that Grotius insisted upon and that he found to be lacking in his opponents' treatment of the Vorstius aff air. 20 For his opponents, it was merely a matter of proscribing certain forms of public speech. Yet at the same time they held themselves to be tolerant in religious aff airs. 21 granted to heretics by this edict. Grotius refers to Lactantius and Cassiodor to confi rm the principle that belief is not a matter of command. 24 Th is brings to the fore the tension between the freedom of opinion implicit in CTh 16,5,5 and the imposition of Nicene orthodoxy in CTh 16,1,2.
25 Th is tension is relevant for Grotius's own times. In Ordinum pietas Grotius points out critically that Anabaptists in Friesland could be tolerated, whereas Vorstius could not be suff ered in their own ranks. 26 In support of his position Grotius turns to the Early Church.
According to Grotius, the experience of the Early Church already showed that mistakes in the handling of heterodoxy, such as possibly happened in the case of the Dutch states against Vorstius, do not discredit those that erred in their assessment. Grotius undergirds this with a quotation from Eusebius, which accordingly carries some weight. Grotius takes Firmilian of Caesarea's wait-and-see attitude at a synod that was to judge Paul of Samosata, mentioned in Eusebius, 27 as an example that demonstrates that a false favourable estimation of somebody later deemed to be heretic did not necessarily merit condemnation. 28 Prior to Grotius this quotation from Eusebius was only rarely cited. It nevertheless found print in the diatribes against Vorstius and was thus available to Grotius.
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Grotius replaces questions of dogmatic defi nition with the question of how to handle orthodoxy and heresy in society. Grotius looks for examples of moderation in the Early Church and in this way accomplishes a signifi cant shift of perspective. Issues of procedure rather than content come to the fore, 30 which is of course closely connected to Grotius's own role in the controversy. He states most clearly: 'But the opposite method: "He disagrees with me on predestination, I cannot tolerate him. He is heterodox, he is a heretic, he is a Pelagian. He is a Socinian" should be given up as quickly as possible '. 30 Th is way of going about things -the sharp drawing of lines, the habit of separation -Grotius identifi es as 'the spirit of Donatus'.
31 By identifying his opponents with the 'heretic' opponents of Augustine, he skewers them on their own weapons.
Moderation was not merely a much visited topos and a general call for good sense; moderation, peace and tolerance -' concept van 35 Th is was doubly true; for one, because a person cannot be forced to believe against his own convictions, and for another, because there are times and circumstances that make tolerance a matter of practical necessity.
However, toleration, according to Lubbertus, was only the libertas credendi , 37 which did not include the freedom to make thoughts public. Th e public sermon leaves no room for heterodoxy. One cannot be a heretic with heretics and at the same time be recognized by the orthodox as orthodox. 38 Th us Lubbertus introduces the element of deceit, relevant in part because Vorstius was blamed for interpolating heretical texts and then recommending them under his own authorship to unsuspecting readers. 39 Th e motto 'deceit' gave Lubbertus the opportunity to refer to the passage from Eusebius' Church history that Grotius had cited, one of the very few patristic references in Ordinum pietas that caught his attention. 40 For Lubbertus, as for Grotius, the postponed trial of Paul of Samosata corresponds to the case of Vorstius, but it does so in a fundamentally diff erent way. For Lubbertus, Firmilian does not exemplify moderate and careful judgement; rather, it was the deceit in the two cases that serves as the point of comparison. In taking this position Lubbertus was correcting Grotius by invoking the interpretation given in Eusebius, who emphasized repeatedly that it was Paul of Samosata's trickery that explains Firmilian's hesitation in judgement. In Grotius's paraphrase of Eusebius, the element of deceit still appears, but Grotius's point of reference is diff erent. Grotius distinguishes historical facts and their interpretation. Th us he tries to extract a historical example from Eusebius while leaving behind its interpretation.
For Grotius Firmilian's example stakes out a space for moderation, as Firmilian's postponement of the condemnation of somebody later seen as a heretic did not result in his own orthodoxy being questioned. Th e moderation exhibited here entails a self-limitation that aff ects doctrinal condemnations but also the stringency of doctrine itself: 'Since when has it been a heresy to say less?' 41 But Grotius could have found examples in the history of the fourth century, where to say less was indeed not enough and further clarifi cation proved to be necessary, and Bogerman refers to this very point in his critique. 42 In the texts of the fourth century, however, Grotius fi nds two threads that he takes up here, namely, the conviction that matters of religion are fundamentally simple, and the requirement not to be too curious in matters 37 of religion, not to raise too many questions. Both values are often referred to in the Early Church. Th e prohibition of curiosity in religious matters was specifi cally aimed at the Eunomians, a rather intellectual, speculative group to whom a particularly high degree of curiosity was attributed. 43 Grotius knows of these themes through a small number of quotations of Gregory of Nazianzus, who reappears signifi cantly in this connection.
It is tempting to ask whether Grotius's notion of ancient moderation was infl uenced by his interest in this particular fi gure of the Early Church, Gregory of Nazianzus, who challenged Julian's notion of hellenism and formulated philosophical requirements for Christian leadership. 44 However, the quotations in De imperio do not lead to the conclusion that Grotius had studied Gregory on his own. It is clear that many of them could be found in secondary sources that Grotius had at his disposal.
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To deepen his argument Grotius returns to the Th eodosian and Justinian Codes. For example, he refers to the prohibition of public discussion of the Christian faith imposed by Marcian after the Synod of Chalcedon. 46 Grotius adds further evidence, such as the law of Leo and Anthemius, which he paraphrases as forbidding those who leave their monasteries from discussing faith and doctrine. What is meant here is that monks who have business outside the monastery are forbidden to walk about through Antiochia and other cities arguing matters of doctrine.
47 By referring to the Th eodosian and Justinian Codes, Grotius introduces historical information. Th is leads to a second aspect, Grotius's historical approach to patristic sources.
Grotius uses concepts from the fourth century to discuss the handling of orthodoxy in ancient times. In doing so, he puts to practice requirements for 43 the proper reading of patristic texts in his own times. In Ordinum pietas as well as in De imperio, Grotius identifi es self-restriction, or the liberty to say less, with Augustine's admonition to the Christian rhetorician spelled out in De Doctrina Christiana, 48 that it is not appropriate to say everything everywhere, but rather it is necessary to adapt oneself to the context of the listeners and their possibly limited understanding, as well as to consider the customs of the land. Grotius's notion of moderation or Christian liberty is connected to awareness of context and thereby intrinsically linked to a historical understanding. Grotius still explains Firmilian's false estimation of Paul of Samosata by pointing out that Paul spoke in riddles and thereby led Firmilian astray. But underlying this is the idea that doctrine and orthodoxy undergo a process of development, which implies the requirement to assess historical circumstances and personalities according to the conditions of their time. Anything else leads to the arrogantia of false standards: 'Was Chrysostom a Socinian, was Ambrose, were so many other ancient Fathers? If they lived now, would they not be acceptable in our Church? Th ese questions I would like to see answered. If someone says they are not to be tolerated, his arrogance will be intolerable to all pious people; if he thinks that they should be tolerated, let him not be a respecter of persons; let there be equity, which requires equal treatment in equal cases'. 49 Grotius's argument points out the anachronism that would arise if Justin, Chrysostom and Ambrose were to be judged under the Augustinian paradigm. Using these and similar formulations, he shows that orthodoxy exists in time and is therefore subject to development. As a result, anti-Nicene ideas became an object of interest in their own context, but above all, the era of orthodoxy came to be understood as an historical era.
It is this aspect of Grotius's use of patristic sources that was most controversial and that Bogerman took pains to argue against in his response. Bogerman's argumentation shows that Grotius did not develop his arguments against opponents entirely lacking in historical insight. Certainly Bogerman would have agreed that orthodoxy exists in time. However, this does not lead Bogerman to conclude that orthodoxy is one thing at one time and something else at another time. History provides examples of manifold and even contradictory ideas. Bogerman knows that Augustine condemned many things in Pelagius that can also be found in the writings of Origen and Tertullian, but also Clement, Justin, Irenaeus and Epiphanius. According to Bogerman, however, historical variation comes into being only through mistakes, which 50 in the course of time are corrected through progress and learning. Bogerman therefore concludes that there are many instances of error in history, but these do not result in a continuity of error. If an error happens to occur, that does not mean that the mistake persists or is to be tolerated. According to Bogerman there is no equation between Justin, Ambrose, Chrysostom and Augustine. If Chrysostom had lived only a few decades later, he would have followed the example of Augustine. Orthodoxy puts an end to the history of error, and the history of error does not support a call for tolerance. 50 Bogerman sees progress and change in history as the mechanism by which orthodoxy comes into being, but this does not entail that orthodoxy itself is subject to development. Precisely that, however, would be the precondition for fi nding exemplary models of tolerance in history.
Bogerman's concept of orthodoxy implies distance from the historical Chrysostom. Th e Chrysostom for whom there would be a place in Bogerman's Church would be a diff erent one from the real-life bishop of Constantinople, with his problems with the empress and the aristocracy. Grotius's work also exhibits historical distance, but in his case the distance comes from his interest not only in the history of ideas and their context but also in historical events and circumstances.
Th ere are many examples, particularly in De imperio , where Grotius switches to a descriptive, historical language and develops historical argumentation. In line with his own point of view, he describes the emperors of the fourth to sixth centuries as being involved in matters of religion: 'It was not the Church of Alexandria that sent Dioscur to the Synod of Chalcedon, but the Emperors Th eodosius and Valentinianus themselves who ordered him to attend'. 51 Here Grotius is clearly shifting to a descriptive perspective. He singles out significant events that he fi nds in the writings of the historians, particularly in Socrates and Th eodoret, in the acts of the councils, and fi nally in ancient legal sources. By referring to the decree that forbade monks to leave their monasteries and stir up unrest by provoking doctrinal debates and to the decree forbidding the clergy to play dice or attend the theatre, 52 Grotius illustrates his points with historical vividness. Th e question of jurisdiction over sacred matters, particularly episcopal jurisdiction, 53 : 'Whenever Alexander (Severus) desired to name any man governor of a province, or to make him an offi cer in the army, he always announced his name publicly and charged the people, in case anyone wished to bring an accusation against him, to prove it by irrefutable evidence, and he used to say it was unjust that, when Christians and Jews observed this custom in announcing the names of those who were to be ordained priests, it should not be similarly observed in the case of governors of provinces.' Th e quotation was used by Bilson, but its inclusion shows Grotius's interest in the comparison of ancient secular and early Christian references. pertinent texts in the Codex Th eodosianus and the Leges novellae . Grotius sets the quotations in a historical framework and invokes them as evidence for his theses: 'It was only after the emperors had embraced Christianity that a part of jurisdiction was given to the pastors'. 54 In another passage Grotius diff erentiates between two concepts, found in the Codex Th eodosianus , namely, the ἀϱχισυνάγωγοι and the patres synagogarum, identifying the latter with elders or seniors. And again, his conclusions are interesting: fi rst, that there was a hierarchy in which the ἀϱχισυνάγωγοι were subordinate to the elders, and second, that these 'remarks serve ad illustrandam episcoporum originem '. 55 Raising the question of the roots of the offi ce of bishop is a shift from description to explanation. For Grotius, explanation means, fi rst of all, that he places historical matters in context. He relates the offi ce of bishop to the offi ces of the synagogue; he places Christian institutions in relation to pagan Roman customs. After distinguishing various forms and extents of episcopal jurisdiction involved, Grotius turns to regulations concerning jurisdiction within the ancient Jewish community. Laws concerning Jewish privileges serve as an explanatory background. 56 Grotius has even more material at his disposal: he brings in remarks by Caesar concerning Druids in Th e Gallic War and by Plutarch concerning the Athenians, and he takes this line even further into the Old Testament, pursuing the notion of ancient usage, vetustissima consuetudo . Grotius relates the ancient Christian practice of publicly proclaiming the name of the man to be elected as bishop to analogous practices concerning imperial offi ces. 57 In his writings, contextualisation involves both religioushistorical comparison and the integration of general sources from antiquity. Th is juxtaposition of sources, typical for Grotius, always refl ects a historical 58 Cf. dimension for him. With regard to early Christian sources, this means that Grotius understands them as deeply rooted in the broader ancient context.
Grotius's drawing of connections between Christianity and other ancient traditions does not only serve to search for the old, fundamental truths or to fi nd in the concord between Christianity, Judaism and Antiquity an indication of 'right reason', common to humankind, or existing before the corruption of the old faith.
58 Much more to the point, there is a historical aspect to the juxtaposition of these religious sources, and, as when Grotius speculates on a relationship between the patres synagogarum and the origin of the offi ce of bishop, it can create a historical context.
Th e historical context serves as an explanation, and this implies that Grotius was aware of historical problems and participated in raising historical questions. Th is becomes clear from the following example. Grotius discusses the formal procedures of the synods of the Early Church, and, in this context, their convocation by the emperor. Th is last point leads to the question of synods during the time of pagan emperors. Grotius concludes that 'no permission was needed where no imperial edicts stood against it'.
59 To prove this, Grotius refers to attestations of the existence of religious associations, collegia, which he fi nds in the Digests 60 and of associations in general, hetaeria , in Asia Minor, which he deduces from the letters of Pliny to Trajan. 61 To apply this historical information to the legal situation of Christians at the end of the fi rst century, he uses material on the Jews given by Philo. In this passage Grotius presents a historical argument of several steps, a part of which is his reading of the Pliny letters.
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A further element that bespeaks a historical approach is Grotius's notion of change. Although Grotius is only concerned to show that a certain way of electing pastors cannot be taken as the general practice in the time of the Early Church (a very common mode of argumentation), it is remarkable that Grotius emphasized that change aff ected even apostolic institutions, that requirements of canon law were not always followed, and that the rules laid down by Justinian diff ered from earlier custom. Grotius concludes: 'For whether we look at ancient or more modern times, we fi nd enormous variation in the method of election; not only across centuries and provinces, but also over years and individual cities'. 63 Th ese few remarks show that the idea of change is an integral part of Grotius's picture of the Early Church; the last quotation makes it particularly clear that he was aware of context.
Ordinum pietas and De imperio show elements of a historical approach that has much in common with the French method of teaching law, the mos gallicus . A sense for cultural variation, the notion of change, the question of origins, but above all the comparative method and a historical interest in offi ces and institutions have characterized legal humanism since Guillaume Budé. It is evident that methods of humanist jurisprudence appear in Grotius's writings on ecclesiastic and religious matters. Th e interest of philologists in Roman law from a historical perspective led to the French convergence of legal and historical studies and to the historicization of the studies of Roman law. Budé insisted that not only lawyers but also philologists be admitted to legal studies. 64 Grotius took this route by studying the Early Church as a lawyer and philologist. His comparative method brought together diverse sources to explain historical circumstances. He uses Roman legal texts as a historical source in the context of Church history. Th is corresponds to the practise of François Baudouin in his Constantine of 1556, 65 which Grotius later mentions having read. 66 Baudouin was the one who most clearly spelled out the need to study history alongside law and who gave shape to the historicization of law. 67 Even more signifi cant for reading Grotius, however, is Baudouin's insistence on not separating civil history and Church history. 68 Th is position was part of his concept of a universal history, one that encompasses civil, religious and military spheres. 69 Th is integrative approach to history is founded on the observation of concrete particulars and circumstances.
Grotius's comparative approach assumes a similar connection between civil history and Church history and requires a corresponding breadth of scope. Th is breadth is illustrated by a list given by Gerardus Vossius in his Ars Historica of 1623, consisting of elements such as regions, cities, customs, institutions, philosophical teachings, military exploits and the public and private life of individuals. Grotius acquired many books on ancient times from Vossius, 70 and they conducted an intensive exchange while Grotius was working to justify his position by writing De imperio . Th e comparison with Vossius's Ars historica, which can serve to illustrate the state of refl ection on method in Grotius's immediate circle, underlines the impact of legal humanism on Grotius. Vossius's Ars historica is still in the rhetorical tradition that describes the ars and techne of historical craft and seeks a balance between a history that risks degenerating to a nuda narratio, and a history in the sense of notitia or cognitio of what is useful to remember for the sake of a good and happy life. Vossius can defi ne the goal of history thus: ut ex singularibus universale praeceptum observetur. 71 Keckermann had a similar formulation: 'History, therefore, is the explanation and knowledge of particular or individual things, undertaken in order that through them we may understand universal truths more clearly and fi nd them confi rmed'. 72 In contrast to Vossius and Keckermann however, Grotius's interest in historic institutions and details was not subservient to his allegiance to universal truths; rather, his sources provide historical evidence of the practice and customs in question.
II. Comparative Method and Patristic Texts in De Iure Praedae
Reading through De iure praedae ( IPC ), 73 the juxtaposition of patristic and other classical sources again catches the attention. Th is contextualization of Christian texts, which later largely characterized Grotius's reading of early Christian literature, is already visible in IPC . 74 His approach to early Christian literature had therefore already been formed before he came into contact with Vossius in 1613 and before the debate required him to engage himself with patristic sources. Th is may be illustrated through examples, beginning with chapter four of IPC . Th ere, Grotius shifts to his main topic, the question of prize and booty. After Grotius has deduced from legal principles that the institution of prize and booty must be considered as part and parcel of warfare, and that it is in accordance with the law of nature, as well as the law of nations, he must address Christian objections. Grotius seeks to persuade the reader through examples, and the interpretation of Scripture plays a role here. Th e copious material concerning warfare in the Old Testament (OT) clearly exhibits the taking of booty as a practice of the Israelites. But the pertinent passages in the OT, for example Deut. 20.14, seem to be contradicted by John the Baptist's dictum in Luke 3.14, 'And the soldiers likewise demanded of him, saying, And what shall we do? And he said unto them, Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages'. Grotius gives a historical explanation of the verse that is interesting, above all, against the background of western exegesis.
Grotius understands the verse as a potential objection and in response states that the situation assumed in Luke 3.14 was fundamentally diff erent from the situation of the taking of booty, as John the Baptist's addressees were not soldiers at war but instead occupation troops stationed in Judaea, and their potential victims were provincials, tenants and farmers. John called upon the soldiers to spare them and not to rob innocent peasants. According to Grotius, John says nothing more than what was already anchored in law. Grotius echoes thereby a broad consensus, but it turns out that the consensus is limited to the understanding that the verse is not to be taken as an admonition to give up soldiery. In fact, Luke 3.14 was generally interpreted against the background of a strong tradition epitomized by the often quoted words Militare non est delictum, found in a homely that was printed in the sixteenth-century editions among the works of Augustine. 75 But who is intended in Luke 3.14 under miles ? Th e answer often given is: whoever receives wages ( stipendia ), and this includes the cleric, so that the lemma is often found in connection with ecclesiastical offi ces and simony. 76 Th e tradition reaches from Ps.-Augustine to Ivo of Chartres and Gratian. In the East as well, Luke 3.14 fi nds application, being integrated into general ethical instructions. Th ese instructions do concern soldiers, but they are far from the real soldiers of Grotius in the winter station in Judaea. Grotius's historical reasons for stating that the verse is not concerned with res hostium are clearly distinct from the Augustinian tradition of exegesis. In his interpretation, Grotius merges diff erent lines of thought. As Grotius indicates in the margin, he was led to mention the Judaean peasants by Cajetan, who still wrote in the tradition of ethical instructions. Later, in the Annotationes ad Lucam , Grotius collected extensive material concerning soldiers in Judaea, particularly from Josephus. 77 In IPC these historical explanations bring Grotius to the conclusion that in Luke 3.14 nothing is required that is diff erent from what is in Roman law.
Grotius comes to the same conclusion when he turns to the example of Abraham. Abraham's conduct in war appears to coincide with Roman legal principles. Genesis 14, which recounts Abraham's campaign to free Lot and to recover his possessions from the Sodomites, serves as a classical reference for questions of waging war. Indeed, Abraham relinquished his share of the booty, but according to Grotius Cato. 81 Th is pattern of comparison occurs repeatedly . Th ree examples will illustrate the point. According to Grotius, Abraham's expedition described in Gen. 14 falls under the category of bellum privatum , which, however, did not make Abraham hesitate to take away spoils, as it also did not prevent Caesar from taking booty from the pirates that he captured. 82 Grotius fi nds the Caesar episode again in Plutarch, as he notes in the margin. Abraham 'instructs his allies in regard to the justice of his cause': a similar accounting was required by Achilles. As source, Grotius refers to Statius.
83 Th e justifi cation given in the campaign of the Israelites against the men of Gibeah bore comparison to that given to Minos in his expedition of revenge against the Athenians, according to Diodor of Sicily.
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Abraham and Pericles, Abraham and Caesar, Achilles or Minos are placed alongside each other. Most of these examples from Plutarch Grotius is still citing in his Annotationes ad Genesin . 85 Plutarch, Dionysios Halicarnassos and Diodor of Sicily appear on the exegetical horizon of the OT. Th is means nothing more than that Grotius uses his own resources to interpret Gen. 14, namely classical literature, as he cannot draw on the patristic or scholastic tradition of exegesis. Accounts in the OT become plausible in the context of classical antiquity; they become comparable to non-biblical sources. Here the 'juxtaposition of sources' later elaborated by Grotius is already present, without Grotius actually developing a historical argument. However, he gives a certain emphasis to the historical parts of the OT. He returns to Deut. 20.14 and especially to Gen. 14 in various chapters in IPC. He draws a certain historical thread through the text. But what about the patristic texts? How does he bring them into play?
Th is question is particularly pressing because Grotius cannot draw on the strongly allegorical patristic or scholastic tradition of interpretation of the texts mentioned above (Luke 3.14, Deut. 20 and Gen. 14), as represented by Hrabanus Maurus or Bede, for example. When one considers that the fi ve kings against whom Abraham fi ghts in Gen. 14 represent for Bede the fi ve senses, or that for Ambrose, the virtus and faith of Abraham bring about the victory, the distance to Grotius alongside Caesar but also next to Constantine. 86 Th e manuscript shows that Grotius later inserted the example of Th eodosius, then a quotation of Ambrose on justice, followed by Seneca, which then led him back to Cicero and to his original text.
Patristic texts, and there are only a few examples in IPC, are also brought into the exegetical argument. Here the names of Ambrose and Augustine come up through two short excerpts, one from Ambrose's work on Abraham 87 and another from Augustine's Quaestiones in Heptateuchum ; both are cited in Decretum Gratiani.
88 From Ambrose's work, only the fi rst book is cited and not the second, far more allegorical book. But the fi rst book also pursues a theological aim in its exegesis of Gen. 14, where Ambrose treats the question raised by Abraham's refusal of the spoils. Why did Abraham choose to forgo the spoils? According to Ambrose, Abraham was aware that he owed the victory not to his own eff orts but to God. Ambrose then uses the principle that reckons wage labour as a form of slavery, so that the choice arises, either to lower oneself to the level of a mercenary or to preserve one's honour. Th is line of thought, which connects the taking of spoils with wage dependence, did not interest Grotius.
For Grotius, the Abraham story establishes the right to take spoils, for Abraham could not in good conscience have given to his men something to which he himself had no claim. Grotius mentions a tradition according to which Abraham had taken a vow before the campaign to forgo all booty. What is meant here is Ambrose's explanation, which Grotius paraphrases as involving a vow. Such a self-imposed disclaimer necessarily entails there being something to which one is entitled. But do the spoils really belong to Abraham? Ambrose, who depicts Abraham as an example of virtue, encounters a further problem when he raises the question of why the King of Sodom off ers part of the spoils to Abraham. Th is question leads Ambrose to point out the duty to share the spoils among allies, and Grotius concludes that this principle was in force up to the time of the Maccabees.
89
Ambrose's last-mentioned explanation is the only text that Grotius actually quotes later, which he does in connection with the Roman customs depicted by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Grotius singles out details from the Ambrose text and arranges them in such a way that they are relatable to 90 Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum , IV.44 (CSEL, 28, 2, p. 353.2-5, Zycha), IPC , XII (p. 207.5-9, H.).
Plutarch, Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and as mentioned he can move from the virtus of Abraham as described by Ambrose to the motives of Pericles and Marcus Cato. Th e same bridging can be seen in Grotius's quoting of Augustine's comment on the war of the Israelites against the Amorites in Quaestiones in Heptateuchum . 90 Grotius explains the right of transit with the words of Augustine as a 'law of human fellowship'. As such, the denial of this right was seen as a just reason for war by Augustine, referring to the war of the Israelites against the Amorites, and by others, as illustrated by further examples that Grotius found in Sophocles, Tacitus and again in the Crusades.
Th ese two examples -the dictum of John the Baptist and the fi gure of Abraham -may suffi ce, fi rst, to illustrate a certain continuity in Grotius's approach to ancient texts through the juxtaposition of Christian and other ancient sources in IPC , second, to draw attention to hints that reveal Grotius's development of a historical approach, and third, to show his contextualization of patristic texts within the framework of antiquity.
